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ABSTRACT
Under BC’s Family Law Act (FLA), the best interests of the child are now
the only consideration when resolving legal disputes over parenting
arrangements. This seemingly neutral concept of the child’s best interests
can, however, have an unequal effect on the interests of others in family
law actions. In relocation disputes, custodial or primary caregiver parents
(who are still primarily women) tend to be more constrained by this
decision-making framework than non-custodial or access parents (who are
still primarily men). Consequently, BC’s law of parental mobility may
produce adverse effects that disproportionately affect women.
This paper first explores how the best interests principle became central to
BC’s family law reform agenda and ultimately to the FLA, including its
precedent-setting relocation provisions. Secondly, it considers the effect of
BC’s legislative choice to elevate the best interests of the child above all
others, with specific reference to relocation. It suggests that the rights of
women are being disproportionately impacted, and refers to two recent
relocation cases decided by the BC Court of Appeal: Duggan v White and
Barendregt v Grebliunas. Finally, it considers prospects for reform of the
current relocation regime with a view to re-injecting parents’ interests and
rights into the balance.
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INTRODUCTION
The “best interests of the child” is the central guiding principle of parenting
provisions in BC’s Family Law Act.1 This includes provisions on relocation: the
law of parental mobility. The child’s best interests have gone from being the
“paramount” consideration in the FLA’s predecessor, the Family Relations Act,2 to
the “only” consideration in determining parenting arrangements under current
legislation. In other words, the child’s interests were, previously, the most
important among a range of considerations, suggesting a recognition and
balancing of other interests. Today, the child’s interests must be the only
consideration when resolving legal disputes over parenting arrangements. If there
is only one set of interests to consider, there can be no balancing among
competing interests.
In this paper, I argue that this seemingly neutral concept of the child’s best
interests can have an unequal effect on the interests of others in family law
actions. Specifically, I consider the operation and effect of the best interests of
the child within relocation disputes. I suggest that putting the child’s interests first
has an unequal effect on parents. Custodial or primary caregiver parents (still
primarily women)3 tend to be more constrained than non-custodial or access
parents (primarily men) by this decision-making framework.4 As a result, the law
may produce adverse effects disproportionately affecting women.
SBC 2011, c 25 [FLA].
RBSC 1996, c 128, as repealed by ibid, s 259 [FRA].
3 See Statistics Canada, Parenting and Child Support After Separation or Divorce. Spotlight on
Canadians: Results from the General Social Survey, by Maire Sinha, Catalogue No 89-652-X –
No. 001 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, February 2014) (70% of parents reported that the
mother’s home was the child’s primary residence after separation or divorce and 15%
reported the child lived primarily with the father at 3); Statistics Canada, Portrait of
children’s family life in Canada in 2016, Catalogue No 98-200-X2016006 (Ottawa: Statistics
Canada, 2 August 2017) (“In 2016, 81.3% of children aged 0 to 14 in lone-parent
families were living with their mother, and 18.7% were living with their father” at 3).
4 In this paper, I primarily use the “old” language of custody and access, referring to the
custodial parent (with whom the child primarily resides) or non-custodial (access)
parent, except where citing other sources. I do this because I think the old language is
1
2
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While contested relocations with children tend to be rejected more often
than approved,5 for both men and women, it is overwhelmingly women who seek
to move with a child.6 Thus, by tending to favour non-relocation, the law
disproportionately denies women the ability to move to access support,
educational and work opportunities, and new relationships—the primary reasons
parents seek to move7—while maintaining their role as primary caregiver. It is the
best interests of the child principle that steers the law towards staying put.
In relocation disputes, children’s interests can conflict with their parents’
interests (or at least one parent’s interests). While it is the parents who engage
with the law to provide notice of the child’s move, or to object to such a move,
only the child’s interests are to be considered when resolving the dispute.8 Like
custody and access more generally, relocation is “a unique area of our law, insofar
as the litigants … have no legitimate rights or interests in the outcome.”9 Parents
seek to move, but it is the child’s interests that are determinative under the law.
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that the best interests of the child
is not a principle of fundamental justice.10 And yet, in relocation, children’s
easier to understand—compare custodial parent to a guardian with or without
substantially equal parenting time—and because the new language, which speaks of
parenting time and parenting decisions, obscures the labour of caregiving and custody.
Critics of the concepts of custody and access describe them as unduly focused on
parental rights, outdated, and promoting “a winner-loser mentality between separated
parents that promotes conflict;” see e.g. Nicholas Bala et al, “Shared Parenting in
Canada: Increasing Use But Continued Controversy” (2017) 55:4 Fam Ct Rev 513 at
525-26.
5 DA Rollie Thompson, “Legislating About Relocating: Bill C-78, NS and BC” (2019)
38:2 Can Fam LQ 219 at 233; Meredith Shaw, “A Gendered Approach to ‘Quality of
Life’ After Separation Under the British Columbia Family Law Act Relocation Regime”
(2021) 26 Appeal 121 at 128.
6 Thompson, supra note 5 at 222.
7 Nicholas Bala & Andrea Wheeler, “Canadian Relocation Cases: Heading Towards
Guidelines” (2012) 30:3 Can Fam LQ 271 at 290.
8 However, as discussed later, the FLA’s relocation provisions are one area where the
best interests of the child can be interpreted broadly to include, to some extent, the
moving parent’s well-being.
9 Noel Semple, “Whose Best Interests? Custody and Access Law and Procedure” (2010)
48:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 287 at 300.
10 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC
4 [Canadian Foundation for Children].
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interests are able to trump individual interests tied to rights that have been
vigorously defended in law (including in family law) and are now entrenched in
our Constitution: an individual’s Charter rights to mobility (section 6), life, liberty,
and security of the person (section 7), and equality before and under the law and
the equal protection and benefit of the law (section 15).11 This paper asks why, in
a jurisdiction with a powerful Charter of rights, parents’ rights are eclipsed by those
of their children in family law?
This paper is divided into two parts. First, I note the place of the best
interests principle in international law, specifically in the United Nations’
Convention on the Rights of the Child.12 I explore how the concept became central to
British Columbia’s recent family law reform agenda and ultimately written into
the FLA. I review the purpose and intent of the relocation reforms and consider
arguments both in favour and against elevating the child’s best interests in these
reforms. I then introduce the FLA’s relocation provisions, which were the first
to appear in any Canadian statute.
Second, I analyze the effect of BC’s legislative choice to elevate the best
interests of the child above all others, with specific reference to relocation. I first
establish whether there has been a discernible effect on other rights-holders due
to this change, and consider how these effects are distributed among parties to
relocation disputes. I suggest that the rights of women are being
disproportionately impacted and refer to the recent BC Court of Appeal (BCCA)
decision in Duggan v White as an example as well as Barendregt v Grebliunas as a
counter-example. 13 I then consider what justification, if any, has been put forward
for the elevation of one set of rights over others, given these unequal and rightsinfringing effects. Finally, I provide recommendations for reform to achieve a
more balanced resolution of relocation disputes.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 6, 7, 15, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
12 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, Can TS 1992 No 3 (entered
into force 2 September 1990, ratified by Canada 13 December 1991), online:
<www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx> [CRC].
13 2019 BCCA 200 [Duggan]; 2021 BCCA 11 [Barendregt].
11
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The case law and literature on which this paper relies discuss relocation
disputes and issues between, primarily, mothers and fathers. While the scope is
not purposely limited to male-female parenting arrangements, the reported and
reviewed case law is either expressly focused on disputes between male and
female parents or is not stated. For example, custody data reported in Bala et al is
tabulated by mothers and fathers but does not disaggregate same-sex from
opposite-sex parenting relationships.14 Shaw, on the other hand, who reviewed
all 56 reported decisions from 2013 to 2020 in which the BC courts drew on the
FLA’s quality of life factors in Division 6 relocation analyses, found that only one
dispute was between same-sex partners.15 As a result, the limited data does not
permit consideration of how the gendered dynamics discussed in this paper affect
same-sex parents or other family forms engaged in relocation disputes. Similarly,
the literature, and often the case law itself, does not disclose race, immigration
status, Indigeneity, and other characteristics that would permit an intersectional
analysis of the issues discussed here. A closer consideration of the individuals and
families involved in relocation disputes and their experiences deserves further
study.
British Columbia, through the FLA, has adopted the best interests of the
child as the only consideration for resolving family law matters. These matters,
however, are not unidimensional. Family law disputes involve a multitude of
competing interests and rights. This is particularly so in relocation disputes. The
best interests of the child framework seeks to extinguish much of this source of
conflict and streamline resolution and case processing by employing a singular
lens. Decreasing conflict and increasing efficiency are worthy goals. However, at
what cost to other rights-holders are these efficiencies gained? Sweeping reforms,
such as those introduced with the FLA, risk reversing hard-won victories,
particularly for women as primary caregivers, under the guise of a neutral best
interests standard.
I have chosen relocation law in British Columbia as my focus for three
reasons. First, relocation cases are one of the most frequently litigated areas in
14
15

Bala et al, supra note 4 at 520-21.
Shaw, supra note 5 at 128.
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family law16 and are, consequently, the source of significant jurisprudence.
Second, British Columbia, through the FLA, was the first jurisdiction in Canada
to provide a legislative framework for resolving relocation disputes, one that is
firmly grounded in the best interests of the child.17 And third, relocation law
engages—and, for one parent, disrupts—fundamental rights to mobility, liberty,
security of the person, and equality, and this calls for continuing scrutiny.

I. THE RISE OF THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
The best interests of the child principle is not new to Canada, BC, or family
law. Professor Semple notes that even before “best interests” language was
integrated into statutes, courts were making custody and access decisions solely
based on the best interests of the child since the late 1970s.18 In BC, the best
interests standard was also a key feature of the FRA, enacted in 1978.
The FLA defines the factors to be considered when determining the best
interests of the child (see sections 37(2) and 38), as do most provincial and
territorial statutes as well as the newly revised federal Divorce Act.19 In BC’s statute,
these factors include the history of care of the child; the impact of family violence
on the child’s safety, security or well-being; the child’s views, unless it would be
inappropriate to consider them; and any civil or criminal proceedings relevant to

Susan B Boyd & Matt Ledger, “British Columbia’s New Family Law on
Guardianship, Relocation, and Family Violence: The First Year of Judicial
Interpretation” (2014) 33:3 Can Fam LQ 317 at 328. See also Ministry of Attorney
General, Justice Services Branch, Civil Policy and Legislation Office, “White Paper on
Family Relations Act Reform: Proposals for a new Family Law Act” (July 2010) at 69.
17 Trudi L Brown, British Columbia Family Law Practice 2020 (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2019)
at 883. After BC, relocation provisions were adopted by Nova Scotia, and most recently
in the amendments to the federal Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), as amended by
An Act to amend the Divorce Act, the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act
and the Garnishment, Attachment and Pension Diversion Act and to make consequential amendments
to another Act, SC 2019, c 16.
18 Semple, supra note 9 at 296.
19 Department of Justice, “The Divorce Act Changes Explained: Best interests of the
child” (last modified 5 June 2020), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/fl-df/cfl-mdf/daceclde/div50.html>.
16
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the child’s safety and well-being.20 These factors are largely similar to those
included in the more recent Divorce Act revisions (at section 16(3)). Over time, the
principle has become more deeply entrenched in statutory law and common law,
as well as in international law.
International influence

In international law, the best interests of the child is a well-established
principle to be considered when administrative and other decisions are being
made that affect children’s rights. The principle is central to the UN’s Convention
on the Rights of the Child, with article 3(1) stating that, “[i]n all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of
the child shall be a primary consideration.”21 It is considered one of the
fundamental values of the CRC and one of four general principles underlying the
interpretation of the CRC’s remaining articles.22
The CRC was developed to respond to an identified gap in attention to
children’s rights. Children require special protections because, according to
retired BC Supreme Court Justice Donna Martinson, “[t]hey do not have the same
ability adults have to know about their rights, to access remedies, and to have
their voices heard.”23 In addition, she adds, “their best interests can easily be
overlooked. And their best interests may conflict with those of adults generally,
or the adults meant to help them.”24 This can certainly be true in relocation.
BC Ministry of Attorney General, “Family Law Act” (last visited 4 August 2021),
online: gov.bc.ca: The official website of the Government of British Columbia
<https://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/justice/about-bcs-justice-system/legislationpolicy/legislation-updates/family-law-act>.
21 CRC, supra note 12.
22 UNCRC, General comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have his or her best interests
taken as a primary consideration (art. 3, para. 1), UN Doc CRC/C/GC/14 (2013) at para 1.
23 The Honourable Donna J Martinson, “Children’s Legal Rights in Canada under the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child” (2016) National Judicial
Institute, Family Law Program: Children at 16, online (pdf):
<www.cba.org/CBAMediaLibrary/cba_na/PDFs/Publications%20And%20Resources
/Toolkits/ChildRights/LegalRightsUnderUNConvention_Martinson.pdf>.
24 Ibid.
20
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While debates linger as to whether the ratified treaty, which has not been
adopted into domestic law, is binding or simply persuasive in Canadian law, the
question is largely irrelevant in BC where the standard adopted into law in the
FLA is considerably higher: the child’s best interests are the “only” consideration
in the FLA as compared to a “primary” consideration in the CRC. Where the
CRC is potentially relevant to BC family law is in providing additional interpretive
guidance on the best interests standard to courts and other decision-makers. For
example, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General
Comment No. 14 states that the best interests of the child should be understood
as a substantive right (i.e., children have the right to have their best interests
treated as a primary consideration); an interpretative legal principle (i.e., if more
than one interpretation is possible, then that which most effectively serves the
child’s best interests should be chosen); and a rule of procedure (i.e., the potential
impact of a decision on a child’s best interests must be considered).25
The CRC has not yet played a significant role as interpretive guide in BC’s
relocation law. However, the instrument’s emphasis on the child’s right to be
heard (article 12(2)) is relevant to at least one proposal for reform (discussed later
in this paper): that if children’s interests and views were represented and
articulated by counsel, on equal footing to those of other parties, then their best
interests would not have to be so carefully protected as the only judicial
consideration.
Family law reform process in BC

In BC, the beginning of the reform process can be traced to 2005, some six
years before the new FLA was enacted to replace the FRA. In May 2005, the
Family Justice Reform Working Group produced a report recommending the
justice system in BC “find better ways to make children’s best interests a
meaningful part of the family justice process.”26 In response, the Ministry of the
UNCRC, supra note 22 at para 6.
BC Justice Review Task Force, “A New Justice System for Families and Children:
Report of the Family Justice Reform Working Group to the Justice Review Task Force”
(May 2005), online (pdf): <www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/aboutbc-justice-system/justice-services-branch/fjsd/final-05-05.pdf>. This group was
25
26

Vol. 30

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

41

Attorney General produced a series of discussion papers on various aspects of
the law to structure consultation, a Report of Public Consultations in 2009, and
ultimately a White Paper in 2010 which proposed language to be incorporated
into the new legislation.27 The consultation process was broad, reportedly
involving 156 stakeholders and eliciting 140 submissions.28
The new FLA was proposed to both modernize and simplify family law in
BC. Lawmakers sought to make the law more understandable and predictable.29
Reform was also driven by efficiency concerns. British Columbia had become,
under the FRA, “one of the most litigious provinces in the country when it comes
to family law litigation.”30 Of the six general policy values listed as underlying the
statutory reform, at least four (italicized) advance efficiency objectives:
-

supporting fair, early, efficient, flexible and proportionate resolution of disputes;
reducing the emotional and financial costs of family break-up;
using out-of-court dispute resolution processes, where appropriate;
using public resources wisely and efficiently;
encouraging families to resolve their disputes in co-operative ways; and
maximizing the ability to discover and effectively apply children’s best
interests while encouraging parents to reduce conflict and the effect of
conflict on children.31

The reformulation of the best interests standard as the only consideration in
parenting disputes aligns with the FLA’s efficiency purpose. Greater certainty,
predictability, and cost savings should result when only one set of interests is
considered. Whether these results have been achieved remains to be seen. As I
will discuss, the jurisprudence around relocation is, still, uncertain.
Support for the elevation of the best interests standard from “paramount”
to “only” was, reportedly, “virtually unanimous” during the consultation
comprised of representatives from the judiciary, Law Society of BC, Canadian Bar
Association, and the provincial government.
27 Ministry of Attorney General, supra note 16.
28 “Bill 16, Family Law Act”, 2nd reading, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative
Assembly (Hansard), 39-4, 28:2 (17 November 2011, morning sitting) [Hansard (17
November 2011)] at 8858 (Jane Thornthwaite).
29 Ministry of Attorney General, supra note 16 at 2.
30 Hansard (17 November 2011), supra note 28 at 8846 (Leonard Krog).
31 Ministry of Attorney General, supra note 16 at 2-3 [emphasis added].
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process.32 This consensus also comes through clearly in the Hansard debate
where there was a high degree of agreement from both sides of the house. Shirley
Bond, the Attorney General at the time, identified the change in the best interests
standard as being “the heart of the bill.”33 Only one member of the opposition,
NDP member Harry Bains, raised a concern about the standard vis-à-vis other
interests and perspectives on the family:
I just want to make sure that I put those concerns before this House
and to make sure that when we are talking about or making statements
such as “best interests of the child” that we also must view them in the
eyes of those who have different cultures and different religious
backgrounds, and make sure that we are sensitive about their needs. 34

Although few in number, there were critical commentators. West Coast
LEAF, for example, advocated for the addition of an application section that
would recognize certain gendered realities in the face of a seemingly genderneutral law focused exclusively on children’s interests. These included women’s
disproportionate responsibility for the primary care of children, “women’s
historical and ongoing disadvantaged position in family and in society,” and “the
need to support and validate women’s autonomy and substantive equality
rights.”35
Like West Coast LEAF, Professors Susan Boyd and Gillian Calder
advocated for recognition of women’s economic needs and disadvantage.
Women’s needs should be given deference as a legitimate reason to relocate, they
argued, particularly when she is the primary breadwinner and caregiver:

Ibid at 42.
“Bill 16, Family Law Act”, Committee of the Whole House, Official Report of Debates of
the Legislative Assembly (Hansard), 39-4, 28:5 (21 November 2011, afternoon sitting) at
8944 (Shirley Bond).
34 “Bill 16, Family Law Act”, 2nd reading, Official Report of Debates of the Legislative
Assembly (Hansard), 39-4, 28:3 (17 November 2011, afternoon sitting) at 8880 (Harry
Bains).
35 West Coast LEAF, “Submission of West Coast Women’s Legal Education and Action
Fund to the Ministry of Attorney General Justice Services Branch Civil and Family Law
Policy Office: Family Relations Act Review, Phase III Discussions Papers” (December
2007) at 7.
32
33
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The ability of parents with primary responsibilities for children to
make decisions in relation to jobs, relationships and family is
apparently being compromised out of a sense that it is problematic to
move children from familiar environments, from a second parent or
from extended family. This trend is particularly significant for women
who are still disproportionately custodial parents post-divorce, and for
whom there still remain gendered pay inequities in the workforce.36

These voices are the only critical perspectives openly available in the
consultation literature connecting the child’s best interests standard with the
displacement of women’s interests and needs.
Product of reform: the FLA enacted with precedent-setting relocation provisions

The best interests of the child are now the only consideration when decisions
are made, or disputes resolved, in or out of court, which affect the child. The best
interests test is defined at section 37 of the FLA and mandates consideration of
“all of the child’s needs and circumstances” including:
-

the child’s health and well-being;
the child’s views;
the child’s relationships;
the history of the child’s care;
the child’s need for stability;
parents’/guardians’ ability to exercise their responsibilities; and
family violence.37

These considerations run through the entire statute, including its relocation
provisions.
The FLA’s relocation provisions were the first of their kind in Canada at
the time.38 No other Canadian jurisdiction had statutory guidance to override the
Supreme Court’s most recent decision on relocation, Gordon v Goertz (which, from
Susan Boyd & Gillian Calder, “Submission to the BC Ministry of Attorney General,
Justice Services Branch, Civil and Family Law Policy Office: FRA Review – Chapter 14,
Relocating Children” (2007) at 2 (a PDF copy of the original submission was provided
by the authors and is cited with permission).
37 Section 38 provides further guidance to decision-makers on how to assess family
violence as part of the best interests test.
38 BC lawmakers looked to US jurisdictions in order to model the relocation provisions
in the FLA, as well as to the Proposed Model Relocation Act drafted by the American
36
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1996, was not particularly recent).39 Gordon, however, offered no rules or
presumptions to guide decisions by courts.40 This gap in guidance led to increased
uncertainty and litigation.41 The uncertainty was such that the BC Government’s
2010 White Paper on family law reform referred to relocation law prior to the
proposed reforms as “rock, paper, scissors territory.”42 The amended Divorce Act,
through its new relocation provisions, will now, hopefully, resolve some of this
uncertainty for relocation disputes governed by the federal legislation.43
The new relocation provisions in the FLA include three primary elements
aimed at addressing uncertainty and reducing litigation: first, a notice-to-move
provision that applies to any guardian (including the non-custodial guardian);
second, a child-centred definition of relocation that “focuses on the impact of the
proposed move on the child’s primary relationships [and] avoids the potential
arbitrariness of distinctions drawn on threshold distances, travel times or
borders;” and third, legislated factors that a judge must (or must not) consider,
including presumptions and burdens of proof.44
Interestingly, relocation is one of the few areas in the statute where factors
other than the child’s immediate best interests (as enumerated in subsection
37(2)) must also be considered. These additional factors include:
-

whether the proposed relocation is made in good faith;
if the relocating guardian has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements
to preserve the relationship between the child and the child’s other guardian(s);
the reasons for the proposed relocation;
whether the proposed relocation is likely to enhance the general quality of life
of the child and, if applicable, of the relocating guardian, including increasing
emotional well-being or financial or educational opportunities; and
a requirement that the court not consider whether a guardian would still
relocate if the child’s relocation were not permitted.45

Association of Matrimonial Lawyers; see Ministry of Attorney General, supra note 16 at
70.
39 [1996] 2 SCR 27, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC) [Gordon].
40 Thompson, supra note 5 at 219.
41 Ibid.
42 Ministry of Attorney General, supra note 16 at 69.
43 Divorce Act, supra note 17, ss. 16.9(1)–16.96(4). These provisions came into force
March 1, 2021.
44 Ministry of Attorney General, supra note 16 at 71.
45 FLA, supra note 1, ss 69(4), 69(6)-(7).
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These provisions provide a rare opportunity for the courts to consider the
parents’ interests within the larger framework of the child’s best interests. As
discussed in the next section, the opportunity has not been sufficiently seized,
although the BC Court of Appeal’s recent relocation decision, Duggan v White,
may herald a change in course.
In summary, the most recent family law reform process in BC, resulting in
the 2013 FLA, elevated the best interests of the child from the paramount to the
only consideration when resolving family disputes involving children. Legal
reform was intended to make the law more simple and predictable, and the family
justice system more efficient. For the first time in a Canadian jurisdiction, the
FLA included specific provisions relating to relocation. These provisions also
centre the best interests of the child. But, unlike other sections, the relocation
provisions permit some consideration of factors other than the child’s immediate
best interests, such as the reasons for the proposed move and whether it is likely
to increase emotional well-being or financial or educational opportunities for the
relocating parent. Part Two considers the effect of these provisions on the
parents involved in relocation disputes.

II. THE LAW’S UNEQUAL EFFECT
Gendered mobility

Despite its gender-neutral language and its singular focus on the best
interests of the child, BC’s relocation law is undeniably gendered in its effect.
Decisions which deny custodial parents the right to move with their children in
effect deny women—who make up the majority of custodial parents46 and are the
vast majority of relocation applicants47—the rights and freedoms enjoyed by
others, and in particular by their opposing non-custodial parent. While this
pattern is not unique to relocation decisions made in BC, it has become even
more restraining for women under the reformed family law regime in BC.
46
47

Statistics Canada, supra note 3.
Thompson, supra note 5 at 222; Shaw, supra note 5 at 127.
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Relocation approvals have decreased over time, both nationally and in BC.
Nationally, litigated relocation application approvals went from 60 percent before
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gordon to 50 percent afterwards.48 In BC, the
relocation success rate between 2001 and 2011 was 54 percent compared to 51
percent nationally.49 Now, since the introduction of the FLA, success rates have
fallen to 45 percent under BC’s provincial statute.50
Professor Thompson argues the FLA’s relocation provisions were intended
and written to be pro-move.51 The relocation must be presumed to be in the best
interests of the child if the custodial parent has satisfied the court that the
proposed move is made in good faith and reasonable and workable arrangements
have been proposed to preserve the relationship between the child and the nonmoving, access parent.52 However, based on what Thompson deems to be
misinterpretation by the courts of the Legislature’s intent, BC has become one of
the most restrictive jurisdictions for mobility.53 For example, despite the promove presumption for custodial parents just noted, only 53 percent of moves
which should have presumptively qualified under this provision—that is, moves
proposed by custodial parents—were approved from 2015 to 2018.54 Thus, the
pro-move presumption was apparently successfully rebutted in nearly half of all
cases.

DA Rollie Thompson, “Heading for the Light: International Relocation from
Canada” (2011) 30:1 Can Fam LQ 1 at 2.
49 Bala & Wheeler, supra note 7 at 288.
50 Thompson, supra note 5 at 233 (based on data from 2015-2018). See also Shaw, supra
note 5 (finding that the court permitted relocation in 46% of the 56 cases she reviewed
from 2013-2020 at 128).
51 Thompson, supra note 5 at 231.
52 FLA, supra note 1, ss 69(4)(a)(i)-(ii). This presumption is rebuttable by the nonmoving parent, per s 69(4)(b) and does not apply where the parents have “substantially
equal parenting time with the child” per s 69(5). In these latter cases, the onus is on the
relocating parent to satisfy the court that the proposed move is in good faith and
reasonable and workable arrangements have been proposed (per s 69(5)(a)), and that the
relocation is in the best interests of the child (per s 69(5)(b)).
53 Thompson, supra note 5 at 233.
54 Ibid. See also Shaw, supra note 5 (providing a detailed analysis of 56 relocation cases
decided between 2013 and 2020 under the FLA, including information on the applicant,
reasons for the move, factors considered, and success rates).
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Because the vast majority of relocation applications are from women
(greater than 90 percent55), restricting mobility clearly has gendered effects. Not
only are women going through the burden of applying to move, but more than
half of women who pursue litigation to secure the right to move are denied.56
Relocation law’s disproportionate effect on women’s autonomy, liberty, and
equality has long been recognized. In its 2007 submission to the family law reform
discussions, West Coast LEAF argued: “The gendered impact of mobility cases
is clear as mothers are the primary custodial parents of children post-separation
and decisions by the courts in limiting or allowing their ability to relocate with
their children challenges women’s ability to make autonomous decisions about
their lives and the lives of their children.”57
In Stav v Stav, Justice Prowse cited with approval Justice Kirby of the High
Court of Australia’s characterization of how the denial of relocation can tread on
the liberty of, primarily, women:
In practical terms, court orders restraining movement of a custodial
(or residence) parent ordinarily exert inhibitions on the freedom of
movement of women, not men…. It will be she, not the husband, who
will usually be confined, in effect, in her personal movements,
emotional environment, employment opportunities and chances of
remarriage, re-partnering and reparenting. Effectively, as here, it is she
who will be controlled by court orders that require her to live, and
make the most of her life, in physical proximity to the husband’s
whereabouts. In this way, inconvenience to the husband is minimised.
But the effect on the wife may be profound. 58

This excerpt from Stav was quoted again in Duggan,59 highlighting the court’s
recognition of the gendered reality of relocation applications—and, more
importantly, their rejection.

Thompson, supra note 5 at 222. See also Eiad El Fateh, “A Presumption for the Best”
(2009) 25:1 Can J Fam L 73 at 78; Bala & Wheeler, supra note 7 at 289.
56 See e.g. Shaw, supra note 5 (of 48 applications by mothers, relocation was permitted in
23 instances at 128).
57 West Coast LEAF, supra note 35 at 27.
58 Stav v Stav, 2012 BCCA 154 [Stav] at para 87.
59 Duggan, supra note 13 at para 16.
55
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Why do parents move?

The adverse effects of denied mobility are clearer when the equality- and
security-seeking reasons for relocation applications are considered. The top
reasons for seeking to relocate are: 1) for economic well-being, such as a job
transfer, better job opportunity, or educational upgrading; 2) for a new
relationship; and 3) for better family support.60 Better family support (the third
reason) is often crucial to enable single parents to pursue improved economic
well-being (the first reason), particularly when affordable childcare options are
limited. To this list, Shaw adds affordability and availability of housing (a
motivating factor in 38% of the cases reviewed) and family violence (raised in a
quarter of the cases).61 These factors are significant for female relocation
applicants because “women are more likely to be left in a worse financial position
following separation than are men and … women are more commonly the targets
of family violence.”62
The disparity in income between moving and non-moving parents highlights
the existing inequality between custodial and non-custodial parents, and is
reflective of the broader economic inequalities between women and men in
society. The gap underscores why women seek to move: the average annual
income of moving parents in Bala and Wheeler’s study was $38,756, whereas that
of the non-moving parents was $62,217.63 When women are denied the right to
move with their child(ren), they are denied the freedom to improve their
economic well-being. Stated differently: in these cases where the move is
motivated by improved job prospects and/or family support to facilitate labourmarket participation, courts are preventing women—specifically, single
mothers—from pursuing the dual goals of career and raising a family. Viewed
through the lens of the child, this may also be contrary to the child’s best interests.

Bala & Wheeler, supra note 7 at 290.
Shaw, supra note 5 at 136, 139.
62 Ibid at 136.
63 Bala & Wheeler, supra note 7 at 290.
60
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New data shows that growing up in a lower income family has a lasting effect on
a child’s educational attainment, health status, and income as adults.64
Duggan provides a cogent example of economic well-being as a driver for
mobility.65 Until two lower court decisions were overturned by the Court of
Appeal,66 the case was also an example of the courts’ reticence to recognize and
consider the legitimacy of the moving parent’s interests.
Duggan v White, 2019 BCCA 200

Duggan concerned a mother’s request to move within BC from the
Kootenays to Langley with her two-year-old son in order to obtain the university
degree necessary for a career in correctional services, which was unavailable in
the Kootenays.67 The mother secured subsidized housing, full-time daycare, and
had extended family and friends in the Lower Mainland to assist her.68 She was
the child’s primary caregiver.69 At the time of her relocation application, she was
working as a house cleaner and also relied on social assistance, with reported
annual income ranging from $9,870 to $17,678.70 Mr. White, the father and
respondent, was working at a sulphide bleaching plant and earning $74,780
annually with a benefits package.71 His work was not portable.72 Prior to the
proposed relocation, Mr. White did not exercise substantially equal parenting time

Statistics Canada, Intergenerational income mobility: The lasting effects of growing up in a lowerincome family, (infographic), Catalogue No 11-627-M (Ottawa: Statistics Canada,
September 2020).
65 Duggan, supra note 13.
66 The case was first heard at BC Provincial Court (unreported), where the mother’s
move was denied, and then appealed to the BC Supreme Court, which dismissed her
appeal without reasons for judgement (Duggan v White, Nelson Docket No. S20223, as
reported in Duggan v White, 2019 BCCA 200). The BCCA overturned these decisions
and allowed the move.
67 Duggan, supra note 13 at para 32.
68 Ibid at para 34.
69 Ibid at para 29.
70 Ibid at para 38.
71 Ibid at para 40.
72 Ibid.
64
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(that is, he was the access parent), but did have regular and increasing parenting
time with the child.73
At trial in Provincial Court, Ms. Duggan’s relocation request was denied. A
second order was made regarding parenting time, assuming she would not move
without the child, an assumption specifically disallowed by the statute.74 The court
provided a specific schedule, organized around Mr. White’s work, assigning over
70% of the parenting hours to Ms. Duggan.75 Viewed through a critical feminist
lens, the court favoured Mr. White’s career, consigned Ms. Duggan to lowincome work (as her planned-for educational improvements were denied with the
move), and assigned the lower-income parent unpaid caregiving for the benefit
of the higher-income parent’s career and access benefits. As observed by Boyd
and Calder in 2007, “where a move may provide a custodial parent with better
work or more access to family caregiving or support, denying the move … seems
the unjust result.”76 Here, Ms. Duggan, the custodial parent, was effectively
denied opportunity for self-improvement and support (without having to leave
her son), while Mr. Duggan’s already advantageous economic position was
buttressed with convenient access, convenient childcare, and stability.
Ms. Duggan appealed this decision. Justice Saunders of the BCCA, who
ultimately approved the mother’s relocation with the child,77 draws attention to
the equality concerns at play in this and other relocation disputes, suggesting that
there may indeed be a role for consideration of the mother’s economic equality
interests:
Opportunities for employment and education are not spread evenly
throughout the province. For this reason, it is not unusual for parties
in family disputes to have to adapt to changes that require relocation…
In my view, just as parties must adapt, courts must allow for adaptation
in parenting situations, and be assiduous in seeking to avoid results that
Ibid at para 29.
Ibid at paras 41, 58. FLA, section 46(2) reads: “To determine the parenting
arrangements that would be in the best interests of the child in the circumstances set
out in subsection (1) of this section, the court … (b) must not consider whether the
guardian who is planning to move would do so without the child.”
75 Duggan, supra note 13 at para 41.
76 Boyd & Calder, supra note 36 at 3.
77 Duggan, supra note 13 at para 70.
73
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artificially keep one of the parents down. The best interests of the child
is a large concept – one which, in my view, can be quite capable of
providing, with a generous stance, an opportunity for one of the
parents to lift himself, or herself, closer to the level of the more
advantaged parent.78

As Justice Saunders underscores, in a province where opportunities are not
evenly spread (much like the rest of Canada), upward mobility often requires
geographic mobility.
While discussing how the trial judge erred in requiring necessity to justify
the move, Justice Saunders makes increasingly stronger equality arguments in
favour of the right to move, each time grounding them in the best interests of the
child. For example, she notes that staying where the father is “may keep [Ms.
Duggan] in a situation of comparative under-employment for a longer period of
time” and she asks “how the prolongation of such unequal circumstances can be
in the best interests of the child.”79 She points, instead, to the established view in
family law that individual financial independence is “consistent with the best
interests of children caught in the breakdown of family relationships.”80 She then
argues that the FLA’s defined scope of the best interests of the child “provides
room for considering the concepts of equal opportunity, review of the present
disparity between the economic circumstances of the parents, and recognition of
the potential prolongation of that disparity consequent on the decision made by
the judge on the application before him.”81 Her reasoning suggests that courts
should not be blind to the inequalities that a narrow consideration of the child’s
best interests can sow or sustain.82
Throughout her judgment, Justice Saunders tethers each of her arguments
in favour of the mother’s liberty and equality interests to those of her child’s best
interests. In effect, she does just what Boyd and Calder warn against in the
opening lines of their 2007 submission: “Parents should not have to prove that a
Ibid at para 68.
Ibid at para 63.
80 Ibid at para 65.
81 Ibid at para 66.
82 Ibid at para 68.
78
79
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move is calculated to improve the best interests of children in order that it be
approved.”83 But there is a clear and sustained sub-narrative throughout the
judgment bringing attention to the mobility, liberty, and equality rights of
custodial parents—one that is ultimately satisfied in the decision to grant Ms.
Duggan’s move. In this way, Justice Saunders’ approach in Duggan differs from
other FLA relocation decisions, as discussed below.
Uncertainty

While the FLA’s relocation provisions were meant to bring greater certainty
to the law,84 the BC courts’ interpretation of these provisions has been anything
but certain. For example, prior to Duggan, key cases on subsection 69(7) held that
the relocation provision does not preclude the court from considering the status
quo parenting arrangement.85 This is important because when the status quo is
considered in the best interests test, it will tend to favour the case of the parent
opposing the move. For this reason, some argue it should be precluded or it will
function as an anti-move presumption. In CMB v BDG,86 Justice Fleming
reasoned that to preclude consideration of the status quo “is to risk prioritizing
the rights of the relocating parent over the best interests of a child.”87 In Walker
v Maxwell,88 Justice Harris held that the trial judge was not to be criticized for
finding that the status quo scenario was where the child’s best interests were
served.89 Similarly, the court held in Fotsch v Begin90 that subsection 69(7) does not
expressly preclude the court from considering the status quo.91 However, in
Duggan, the most recent appellate decision to explicitly discuss the status quo,92
Boyd & Calder, supra note 36 at 1.
See the “Ministry Comment” on FLA s 69 in Brown, supra note 17 at 935.
85 Section 69(7) concerns relocation where there is an existing written agreement or
order respecting parenting arrangements, in contrast to section 46 which applies where
there is no written agreement or order, as was the case in Duggan.
86 2014 BCSC 780.
87 Ibid at para 104.
88 2015 BCCA 282.
89 Ibid at para 36.
90 2015 BCCA 403.
91 Ibid, ratio taken from Brown, supra note 17 at 936.
92 Since Duggan, the BC Court of Appeal has issued two other decisions engaging
relocation issues: Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2021 BCCA 11, discussed below, and Johansson v
83
84
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Justice Saunders holds that “the status quo approach is eschewed by the Act and
jurisprudence.”93 Justice Saunders determined that, rather than evaluating the
relative merits of the two proposals before him—one from the mother proposing
relocation, and one from the father proposing he become the primary caregiver—
the trial judge erred by constructing and ordering a third parenting option based
on the status quo.94 Instead, she reasoned, the court must assess the proposals
for parenting that have been presented to the court, which, in most cases, will be
the moving parent’s proposal and the non-moving parent’s opposing proposal.
Because the court “lacks authority to require a parent to remain in a community,”
ordering all parties to maintain the status quo is not a viable option.95 However,
the BCCA’s more recent decision in Barendregt v Grebliunas96 appears to do just
that.
Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2021 BCCA 11

Issued after Duggan, the BCCA took an opposing approach in Barendregt. At
the mother was granted primary residence and permission to relocate with
the children from West Kelowna to Telkwa, where she had extended family and
emotional support. On appeal, the court ordered the children be returned to West
Kelowna, where the father continued to reside, to allow for shared parenting and
shared guardianship—under the presumption that the mother would also
return.98
trial,97

At trial, the availability of supports for the mother in the new location and
the father’s questionable financial capacity to house the children in the family
home in West Kelowna mitigated in favour of the move. However, on appeal,
the mother’s needs for emotional support were found not to outweigh the
Janssen, 2021 BCCA 190, which is primarily a dispute about jurisdiction and conflict of
laws.
93 Duggan, supra note 13 at para 18.
94 Ibid at paras 57-59.
95 Ibid at para 20.
96 Barendregt, supra note 13.
97 Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2019 BCSC 2192.
98 Barendregt, supra note 13 at para 91.
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benefits to the children of staying in West Kelowna, with or near their father.99
That the mother did not move for reasons of work or education weakened her
position.100 The father’s position was strengthened, in turn, by admission of new
evidence going to his capacity to house and financially support the children in
West Kelowna.
In Barendregt, the mother’s interests were not sufficiently aligned with her
children’s interests to justify their fulfillment: that is, the mother’s interests could
not be read into a generous interpretation of the best interests of the child, as in
Duggan. Instead, the court, on appeal, overturned the decision which allowed her
to move with the children and ordered a parenting arrangement that assumed her
presence in West Kelowna, despite the court being unable to order her return.
Like the lower court decisions of Duggan, the parenting plan, and so too the
mother’s location, was tethered to the wealthier parent’s (i.e., the father’s)
circumstances.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to address in detail the diversity
of factors at play in these cases, in broad strokes Duggan and Barendregt stand in
opposition to each other in terms of their treatment by the lower and appeal
courts. These recent cases point to the continuing uncertainty in the law of
relocation in BC.
In Duggan, by contrast, three years after filing her initial application, the
mother was granted the right to move by Justice Saunders—ironically,
approximately the same amount of time needed to acquire the degree she
sought.101
Justification

I return to my question of justification: how can the child’s best interests not
merely outweigh but virtually extinguish other rights-holders’ interests? A
Barendregt, supra note 13 at para 90.
Ibid at para 67.
101 Ms. Duggan, in fact, moved with the child prior to hearing the trial-level decision
that denied her relocation request, something that might have been treated as a factor
against her, but which Justice Saunders states as a matter of fact and seemingly without
judgement; see Duggan, supra note 13 at para 36.
99

100
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reasoned justification for the displacement of parents’ rights and interests is not
to be found in the jurisprudence. The supremacy of the best interests of the child
appears to be largely settled.
In the first decade of Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court essentially
decided that the Charter, an individualistic rights tool, should not be applied to
family disputes involving children.102 In Young v Young,103 a case originating in BC,
the Supreme Court considered whether the Charter can outweigh the best interests
of the child.104 The majority of the Court said no: the Charter does not displace
the best interests test. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, writing for the majority on the
constitutional question, held:
It would seem to be self-evident that the best interests test is value
neutral and cannot be seen on its face to violate any right protected by
the Charter. Indeed, as an objective, the legislative focus on the best
interests of the child is completely consonant with the articulated
values and underlying concerns of the Charter, as it aims to protect a
vulnerable segment of society by ensuring that the interests and needs
of the child take precedence over any competing considerations in
custody and access decisions.105

Harvison Young interprets the result in Young not so much as a product of
legal reasoning but as a reflection of a Court, and Canadian society more generally,
deeply reluctant to place children’s interests into conflict with parents’ rights.106
In Young, the individualistic rights model of the Charter was cast as inappropriate
for application to the family. Then, three years later, when the Court heard the
Gordon relocation case, the mobility rights of the moving parent were not even
raised as an issue in the majority decision.107 The parent’s rights were no longer
up for consideration when positioned against the child’s best interest.
Alison Harvison Young, “The Changing Family, Rights Discourse and the Supreme
Court of Canada” (2001) 80:1-2 Can Bar Rev 749.
103 [1993] 4 SCR 3, 1993 CanLII 34 [Young].
104 Ibid (in this custody and access case, the father claimed that his Charter rights to
freedom of religion, expression, and association were denied by the best interests test).
105 Ibid at 71.
106 Harvison Young, supra note 102 at 768.
107 Ibid at 772. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissenting judgement in Young discusses
restrictions on custodial parents’ rights at paras 95-99.
102
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There is remarkably little case law, apart from Young, addressing the potential
of competing rights and interests of parents and children. Two examples can be
cited. In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), the
Supreme Court recognized violation of a mother’s right to security of the person
in a best interests-driven child protection proceeding.108 In Canadian Foundation for
Children, the Court decided that the best interests of the child is not a principle of
fundamental justice capable of justifying deprivations to the Charter’s section 7
rights to life, liberty and security of the person.109 These two examples, while
important in their own right, were not successful in chipping away at the grip of
the best interests of the child principle in family law.110
In Young, the Supreme Court justifies the power of the best interests
standard based on it being value neutral and being “completely consonant with
the articulated values and underlying concerns of the Charter”.111 In relocation
disputes, where the best interests standard operates to silence the relocating
parent’s fundamental rights, it is difficult to reconcile the principle with the
Charter’s concern for protection of individual rights. Courts are unable to directly
infringe the parent’s liberty by ordering them to remain, as Justice Saunders noted
in Duggan,112 but can instead employ the best interests principle to require the
child to stay, forcing the moving parent to make an impossible choice between
their role as a custodial parent and their reasons to move.
More than two decades before the FLA came into force, the late Professor
Marlee Kline argued the best interests of the child ideology can operate to harm
children, particularly those who are Indigenous or racialized.113 While Kline’s
focus on the child welfare system is different from the focus of this paper, her
critique of the best interests principle is relevant to its operation in contemporary
[1999] 3 SCR 46, 1999 CanLII 653.
Canadian Foundation for Children, supra note 10.
110 Notably, in both of these cases, the state was a party to the dispute and so the Charter
had a direct role to play in protecting the individual (or organization) against the power
of the state.
111 Young, supra note 103 at 71.
112 Duggan, supra note 13 at para 20.
113 Marlee Kline, “Child Welfare Law, ‘Best Interests of the Child’ Ideology, and First
Nations” (1992) 30:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 375.
108
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family law issues. Kline explored how the best interests of the child can be used
to suppress other interests and rights, such as maintenance of Indigenous identity
and connection to culture. She argued that portraying the best interests standard
as neutral, impartial, and universal obscures the principle’s disparate, and
sometimes both coercive and destructive, impact on Indigenous children,
families, and communities. She called into question whether the best interests
principle is indeed value neutral as the SCC claimed in Young.
In the academic community today, there seems to be almost total agreement
around the child’s best interests. Semple has noted the “remarkable degree of
consensus” supporting the best interests of the child principle and its “nearuniversality” in statutes, case law, and normative scholarship.114 I observed earlier
in this paper that few voices offered critical perspectives on the best interests
standard during the pre-FLA law reform debates and consultations. However,
even fewer are vocal now: Professor Thompson’s critique of the best interests
standard is one of the only to appear in the current Canadian literature.115 Semple
finds the best interests principle is “so firmly ensconced in the law that most
scholars do not bother advocating [for] or defending it.”116
In 2004, reflecting on the failed federal family law reform process of the late
1990s, in which child support and custody and access law was debated with a view
toward greater reliance on shared parenting presumptions, Boyd questioned if
self-censoring by feminists in order to have their voices better heard and accepted
contributed to the invisibility of women’s interests in subsequent family law
reform debates: “Women’s groups generally have tried in recent years to couch
their concerns by reference to the best interests of children principle rather than
by emphasizing the detrimental impact on women of some of the law reform
proposals. I wonder now if that strategy—of emphasizing children’s interests

Semple, supra note 9 at 290.
See e.g. Rollie Thompson, “Presumptions, Burdens, and Best Interests in Relocation
Law” (2015) 53:1 Family Court Rev 40.
116 Semple, supra note 9 at 298.
114
115
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over women’s—is the right one.”117 Justice Saunders does just this in Duggan: she
reads Ms. Duggan’s legal interests into the “large” and “generous” best interests
concept to arrive at her result in favour of Ms. Duggan’s proposed relocation.118
Boyd recommended changing the conversation by “re-inserting” women’s stories
and feminist analysis “more vocally and evocatively into the public domain.”119
The best interests of the child principle has since become so entrenched that the
only way of “re-inserting” women’s interests may be through the child’s dominant
interests, as was done in Duggan.
Prospects for reform

The prospects for change in an area where there is almost total consensus
is, admittedly, limited. Stephen Toope predicted in 1991, before Gordon, that the
still-new Charter would have little impact on drawing out parents’ rights in family
law, in part because “emphasis upon the ‘best interests of the child’ is so
intuitively attractive that it will not easily be displaced by alleged Charter rights of
the parent.”120 Furthermore, that BC recently went through a five- to six-year
consultation period before reforming its family law regime less than a decade ago
weighs heavily towards a “wait-and-see” approach.
Several options remain that could be pursued short of a law reform overhaul
or constitutional challenge. Semple, for example, identifies a critical inconsistency
in family law ripe for procedural reform. He notes that while the content of the
law is focused exclusively on the interests of the child, the procedure is structured
to protect the interests of the adult litigants.121 This dissonance, he suggests, could
be resolved in one of two ways: either the substance of the law could shift to refocus on the interests of the adult litigants, or the procedure could be reformed
to re-centre the child’s interests, like the current substance of the law does.
Susan B Boyd, “Backlash against Feminism: Canadian Custody and Access Reform
Debates of the Late Twentieth Century” (2004) 16:2 CJWL 255 at 288. For description
of the failed federal reform process, see also Bala et al, supra note 4 at 524.
118 Duggan, supra note 13 at para 68.
119 Boyd, supra note 117 at 288.
120 Stephen J Toope, “Riding the Fences: Courts, Charter Rights and Family Law”
(1991) 9:2 Can J Fam L 55 at 95, cited in Harvison Young, supra note 102 at 768.
121 Semple, supra note 9.
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Semple prefers the latter option and offers, as an initial suggestion, that rules be
devised that consider, from a child’s best interests perspective, “(1) whether
custody and access litigation occurs, (2) how it occurs when it does occur, and (3)
whether and how children’s evidence is heard within it.”122 While Semple’s preferred
reform would likely further undermine consideration of parents’ interests and
rights, it at least furthers consistency between substance and procedure.
However, if Semple’s proposal for procedural reform were taken further, for
example by strengthening the direct representation of children’s interests through
court-appointed counsel (like Ontario’s Office of the Children’s Lawyer or the
Northwest Territories’ Children’s Lawyer), it could serve to create space for
parents’ voices too. Greater representation of children’s views and interests
would be consistent with Article 12(2) of the CRC.123 If the rationale for elevating
the child’s best interests to the only or primary consideration is the vulnerability
of children (as argued by L’Heureux-Dubé in Young) or, as Martinson argued, that
they do not have the same ability as adults to know their rights, access remedies,
and have their voices heard,124 then introducing procedural mechanisms to
address their vulnerability, lack of knowledge, and effectively represent their
interests in the litigation could, theoretically, remove the need for their interests
to be so carefully protected as the only consideration. That is, if children’s
interests and rights are represented and articulated by counsel, they could, then,
be explicitly weighed against those of other parties.125
Another alternative for change would be if reform came from the apex
court. According to Thompson, writing in 2019, the Supreme Court has refused
leave to appeal for relocation cases 24 times since Gordon was decided in 1996.126
Ibid at 328.
CRC, supra note 12.
124 Martinson, supra note 23 at 16.
125 While outside the scope of this paper, this question deserves further study: for
example, does the use of children’s lawyers in relocation disputes have a discernible
effect on the articulation, balancing, and outcome of children’s interests vis-à-vis
parents’ interests?
126 Thompson, supra note 5 at 219. On January 21, 2021, the Supreme Court granted
leave to appeal in Richardson v Richardson, 2021 CanLII 2826 (SCC), on appeal from
Richardson v Richardson, 2019 ONCA 983. Relocation was one of several issues in the case
122
123
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Given the changes to the social, cultural, and economic landscape since 1996, and
the recently amended Divorce Act, a new statement on the law from the Court is
long overdue.
Finally, the most encouraging signs of change come from decisions like
Duggan, which make immediate changes and lay the groundwork for further
incremental change. Unfortunately, the BCCA’s more recent decision in Barendregt
does not take up this pathway to change, instead turning course again. (The
decision does not even make reference, positively or negatively, to Duggan.)
Duggan falls short of a reconsideration of the best interests orthodoxy, but
breathes some life back into parents’ rights by recognizing their interests through
a “generous” reading of the best interests concept. The Duggan decision arcs
relocation jurisprudence a little closer to Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissenting
opinion in Gordon where she argued that “imposition of restrictions on the rights
of custodial parents are and should remain the exception rather than the rule.”127
That restrictions on custodial parents’ rights were once thought of as an exception
to the rule feels very distant from today where parents’ rights often appear to no
longer even be considered part of the equation.

CONCLUSION
In this paper, I sought to demonstrate the potential harmful effects a
seemingly neutral and universally-accepted standard—the best interests of the
child—can produce for other rights-holders, primarily female parents, within
family law disputes when only one standard, or set of interests, is considered.
Women seeking to move with their child have been disproportionately affected
by its operation, which has had the effect of denying their moves in a majority of
cases. Shaw captures succinctly the barriers to substantive equality women face
following separation and seek to overcome through relocation:

but the relocation itself is not an issue on appeal. Leave to appeal was also granted May
13, 2021 in Barendregt (see Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2021 CanLII 39842 (SCC)), however
the issues on appeal appear to primarily concern rules of evidence as opposed to
relocation law and mobility rights.
127 Gordon, supra note 39 at para 95.
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Women are likely to suffer more severely, financially, from the
dissolution of a relationship and are more likely to experience family
violence. Mothers in heterosexual relationships are more likely to have
care of children after separation than are fathers. In the face of those
challenges, many guardians will apply to relocate for reasons that
include seeking out emotional support from extended family and new
partners, better financial opportunities, and housing affordability and
availability.128

Through family law, and relocation law in particular, the state surveils and
intervenes in both the everyday and fundamental life decisions of non-intact
families about where to live, how to earn a living, proximity to support systems,
and new partnerships. Through orders about relocation—which, more often than
not, are orders to stay—courts are conveying, both implicitly and explicitly, that
a non-intact family is less desirable than a traditional family; that it is bad for
children to move frequently (even though the social science research is split on
this question);129 and that maximized contact with both parents is a more
important objective than the individual rights and freedoms of adult parents.
The near-total consensus surrounding the best interests standard provides
little hope for its displacement, particularly by the comparatively unpopular rights
of parents. But recent jurisprudence from the BCCA does provide some hope
that women’s rights to equality, mobility, and liberty might be brought back out
of the shadows. By giving generous scope to the best interests of the child
principle, and reading the relocating parent’s rights into it, Justice Saunders’
decision in Duggan may provide a way to reclaim some freedom for custodial
parents to relocate in order to pursue meaningful opportunities.
Should this be celebrated as a step forward for women? In current
circumstances, where joint parenting is celebrated but unequal responsibility and
constrained liberty is often the effect, then, yes, this is a step forward. But a real
step forward would be if women’s constitutionally-affirmed rights and freedoms
could stand on their own two feet, rather than being carried by their child’s
interests, in family law.
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Shaw, supra note 5 at 121.
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